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STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JUAN P. JARAMILLO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
1'2259 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant-appellant, Juan P. Jaramillo, is appeal-
ing from a conviction by jury of robbery in violation of 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-51-1 ( 1953), in the Third Judicial 
District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, Ji1dge, pnsiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty hy jury of the crime of 
robbery as charged and was sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison for an indeterminate term a;:; prescribed by iaw, the 
sentence being five years to life, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann.,§ 76-51-2 (1953). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent asks this court to affirm the appel-
lant's conviction. 
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STATEMENT or FACTS 
Appellant was charged with the crime of robbery (R. 
7). He originally pleaded not guilty, putting the burden 
on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the 
elements of the crime as charged. Shortly thereafter, he 
withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a guilty plea 
and waived time for passing of sentence. He was sentenced 
for the indeterminate term as provided by law (R. 14). He 
served approximately twenty-seven and one-half months 
in prison and then was allowed to replead, pursuant to 
Judge A. Sherman Christensen's memorandum decision 
dateJ April 23, 1970, on the grounds his guilty plea was not 
valid. 
Thereafter, appellant pleaded not guilty and was con-
victed by jury trial. The court imposed an indeterminate 
term 2.s provided by statute (R. 4~). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENY-
ING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUBMIT EVI-
DENCE OF FORMER JEOPARDY TO THE 
JURY, NOR DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE ISSUE 
OF FORMER JEOPARDY, BECAUSE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THE NEW TRIAL WAS 
NOT DOUBLE JEOPARDY. 
Appellant argues that the issue of once in jeopardy is 
one of fact for the jury. Appella:nt's Brief at 5. He can-
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not prevail on that ai·gument, bc;:ause his new trial atter 
he had suc:ceeded in havmg his original sentence set aside, 
was not double jeopardy. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 
U. S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) · United States v. Ewell, 
383 U. S. 116, 86 S. Ct. 773 ( 1960); United States v. Tateo, 
377 U. S.16:1, 84 S. Ct. 1587 (1964). 
"l W J hen a defendant <'btains a reversal of a 
prior, unsatisfied conviction, he may be refried in 
the normal course of events.' United States v. Ewell, 
supra, at 121. 
"The Fifth Amendme~~t provide::; that no 'per-
son l shall] be subject for the same offense to be 
twice, put in jeopardy of liff' and limb .... ' The 
principle that this provision does not preclude tlle 
Government's retrying a defendant whose convic-
tion is set aside because of an error in the proceer1-
ings leading to conviction fr: a well established part 
of our constitutional jurisprudence." United States 
v. Tateo, supra, at 465. 
Furthermore, even though our statute provides that 
" [a] n issue of fact arises . . . [ u] pon a plea of once in 
jeopardy," Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1 (1953), the trial 
court as a matter of law may find there is not a double 
jeopardy issue, and refuse to submit th~t "issue" to the 
jury. California, which has an ioentical provision in its 
penal code, Deering's California Code, Penal, § 1041 (1961), 
has so held. In People v. Greer, 184 P. 2d 512 (Cal. 1947), 
the court said: 
" [ T] he plea of double jeopardy does not neces-
sarily require a finding by the jury but may require 
a conclusion of law by th~ trial court. [Citations 
omitted.] If, as a matter of law, the previous prose-
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cution could not constitute double jeopa ,·du, the frial 
court 'lS not required to s11l:m·it tlie r;11estio11 to the 
jury for a finding upon tha,t plea." Id. at 516. (Em-
phasis added.) 
The Arizona Supreme Court has held likewise. State 
V. Woodring, 386 P. 2d 851 (Ariz. 1963). 
The law is the same in Utah. The court does not have 
to present the issue of double jeopardy to the jury. In 
State v. Mcinty1·e, 92 U. 177 (1987), the appellant com-
plained that the trial court had iefused ~.o allow the jury 
to consider evidence concerning f0~·mer jeopardy, purusant 
to the Utah Statutes. The court in that case stated: 
"The defendant has the burden of proving his 
plea of ... former jeopardy, and the question as to 
whether he has offered sufficient evidence to raise 
an issue of fact upon which a jury can pass is a 
question of law for th~ court. Id. at 185. 
"In that regard a plea of former jeopardy ... 
differs from a plea of not guilty. A defendant is 
presumed innocent until the state, which has the 
burden of proof to the contrary, has established his 
guilt to the statisfaction of the jury beyond a reason-
able doubt ... On a plea of ... forrner .ieopardy. 
there is no presumption in favor of defendant. He 
has the burden of proof and unless he offers evi-
dence which raises an issue of fact, the court should 
not submit the matter to the jury." Id. at 186. (Em-
phasis added.) 
POINT II. 
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN IM-
POSING AN INDETERMINATE TERM WITH-
OUT SUBTRACTING THEREFROM THE PER-
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5 
lOD OF APPELLANT'S PRIOR IMPRISON-
MENT. 
Appellant argues that when the tnal court imposed 
his present sentence, the time previously spent in prison 
was not credited to him, and thereiore the court erred. He 
cites North Carolina v. Pearce, ~>95 U. S. 711 (1969) to 
support his contention. 
Appellant has not properly expressed the icsue in 
Pearce. He points out in his brief at page 6 that Mr. Pearce 
was tried and sentenced, and then retried and resentenced. 
The second sentence, when added to the time already served, 
amounted to a longer sentence than had been imposed at 
Pearce's first trial. The stricter sentence on retrial pre-
sented one issue in that case, but is not the same issue 
appellant raises in case at bar. Pearce had been credited 
at his second sentencing with ·~he time he had already 
served. However, Rice, whose matter before the Supreme 
Court was also decided in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, 
did raise the issue whether in c0mputing a new sentence 
after retrial, credit must be given for time already served, 
which is the issue appellant in case at bar does raise. 
Rice received a sentence of 25 years on his retrial, but 
had served two and one-half year::;, pursuant t0 hrn mitial 
10 year sentence for which he hac! receivt~d no credit. The 
Court held "that the Constitutional guarantee against multi-
tiple punishments for the same offense absolutely requires 
that punishment already exacted must be fully 'credited' 
in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for same 
offense." Id. at 718. 
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t) 
Hcwcn;r, PeaFcc, supra, clo~s not h~lp the appellant 
in case at bar because appellant here does not come under 
the Pearce ruling. 
In case at bar, appellant was not sentenced to a defin-
ite term, as was Rice, from whicl1 the court could nicely 
subtract the time he had already E-pent in prison. His stat. 
utory sentence is five years to life; how could the court 
have subtracted twenty-seven and one-half months from a 
life sentence? However, that docs not mean the time ap-
pellant has been in prison will be "wiped off the slate." 
Concerning sentencing, our sta.tute provides: 
"Whenever any person is convicted ... ar:d the 
judgment provides for p:mishment in the state 
prison, the court shall not fix a definite term of im-
prisonment; but the sentence and judgment of im-
prisonment in the state prison shall be for a period 
of time not less than the minimum and not to exceed 
the maximum term provided by law . . .'' Utah 
Code Ann., § 77-35-20 (Supp. 1963). 
Under this indeterminate sentence law, the tnal court 
does not impose a definite sentence, and the sentence is 
construed as a sentence for the maximum period prescribed, 
"subject to the right of the Board of Pardons to determine 
the release date of the convicted person from incarcera-
tion." State v. Bassett, 14 U. 2d M2, 414 (1963). 
The Board of Pardons has the duty to determine "when 
and under what conditions . . . [prisoners] . . . may be re· 
leased upon parole, pardoned, ... or [have] their sentences 
commuted or terminated. " Utah Code Ann., § 77-62· 
3(a) (1953). 
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The Board of Pardons, in dealmg with a prisor.er sen-
tenced to an indeterminate term i eceives information from 
the judge and prosecuting attorne.: setting forth, inter alia, 
"any ... information that will ai<f the board of pardons in 
passing upon the application for the termination or com-
mutation of such sentence, or fo1• parole pardon." Utah 
Code Ann.,§ 77-62-8(c) (1953). 
Since the trial court could not have subtracted the 
twenty-seven and one-half months from a life sentence, and 
the indeterminate sentence here i::; construed as a life sen-
tence, State v. Bassett, supra, the issue of whether appel-
lant has not been credited for time already served is not 
presently before the court. 
If the Board of Pardons dues not consider the time 
appellant served prior to his present sentence, the issue 
then might come before the cour4: State v. Perfetto, _____ _ 
U. 2d ______ (Case No. 11914, Oct. 1970). 
Appellant also argues that the court below erred in not 
subtracting from his sentence the time spent in jail prior 
to trial, and that therefore his sentence was prolonged on 
the grounds he had no money to pay bail. The United States 
Supreme Court held in Williams v. Illinois, 90 S. Ct. 2018, 
2023 (1970), "that the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any 
substantive offense be the same for all defendants irrespec-
tive of their economic status." Neither the holding nor the 
unf!erlying policy in Williams was violate:l in case at bar. 
The trial court did not extend appellant's sentence as much 
as one second on the ground he did not make baii. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that thi.:; Court should atfirm ~he 
judgment and sentence of the court below. 
The trial judge did not err in refusing to allow the 
issue of former jeopardy to go tv the jury, nor did the 
court below err in imposing the statutory indeterminate 
sentence without subtracting therefrom the time appellant 
already had spent imprisoned. 
None of appellant's statutory nor constitutional rights 
were violated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
A ltorneys for Respondent 
a 
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